We consider intuitionistic variants of linear temporal logic with "next," "until," and "release" based on expanding posets: partial orders equipped with an order-preserving transition function. This class of structures gives rise to a logic that we denote ITL e , and by imposing additional constraints, we obtain the logics ITL p of persistent posets and ITL ht of here-and-there temporal logic, both of which have been considered in the literature. We prove that ITL e has the effective finite model property and hence is decidable, while ITL p does not have the finite model property. We also introduce notions of bounded bisimulations for these logics and use them to show that the "until" and "release" operators are not definable in terms of each other, even over the class of persistent posets.
INTRODUCTION
Intuitionistic logic [9, 35] and its modal extensions [16, 41, 44] play a crucial role in computer science and artificial intelligence and Intuitionistic Temporal Logics have not been an exception. The study of these logics can be a challenging enterprise [44] and, in particular, there is a huge gap that must be filled regarding combinations of intuitionistic and linear-time temporal logic [42] . This is especially pressing given several potential applications of intuitionistic temporal logics that have been proposed by several authors.
The first involves the Curry-Howard correspondence [24] , which identifies intuitionistic proofs with the λ-terms of functional programming. Several extensions of the λ-calculus with operators from Linear Time Temporal Logic [42] (LTL) have been proposed to introduce new features to functional languages: Davies [10, 11] has suggested adding a "next" ( ) operator to intuitionistic logic to define the type system λ , which allows extending functional languages with staged computation 1 [15] . Davies and Pfenning [12] proposed the functional language Mini-ML , which is supported by intuitionistic S4 and allows capturing complex forms of staged computation as well as runtime code generation. Yuse and Igarashi later extended λ to λ [45] by incorporating the "henceforth" operator ( ), useful for modelling persistent code that can be executed at any subsequent state.
Alternately, intuitionistic temporal logics have been proposed as a tool for modelling semantically given processes. Maier [33] observed that an intuitionistic temporal logic with "henceforth" and "eventually" ( ) could be used for reasoning about safety and liveness conditions in possiblyterminating reactive systems, and Fernández-Duque [18] has suggested that a logic with "eventually" can be used to provide a decidable framework in which to reason about topological dynamics. In the areas of nonmonotonic reasoning, knowledge representation (KR), and artificial intelligence, intuitionistic and intermediate logics have played an important role within the successful answer set programming (ASP) [7] paradigm for practical KR, leading to several extensions of modal ASP [8] that are supported by intuitionistic-based modal logics like temporal here and there [3] .
There have been some notable steps towards understanding intuitionisitic temporal logics:
• Davies' intuitionistic temporal logic with [10] was provided Kripke semantics and a complete deductive system by Kojima and Igarashi [27] . • Logics with , were axiomatized by Kamide and Wansing [25] , where was interpreted over bounded time. • Balbiani and Diéguez [3] axiomatized the Here and There [22] variant of LTL with , , .
• Davoren [13] introduced topological semantics for temporal logics and Fernández-Duque [18] proved the decidability of a logic with , and a universal modality based on topological semantics.
Nevertheless, many questions have remained open, especially regarding conservative extensions of intuitionistic logic with all of the tenses , , , or even the more expressive "until" U and "release" R.
With the exception of References [13, 18] , semantics for intuitionistic LTL use frames of the form (W , , S ), where is a partial order used to interpret the intuitionistic implication and S is a binary relation used to interpret temporal operators. Since we are interested in linear time, we will restrict our attention to the case where S is a function. Thus, for example, p is true at some world w ∈ W whenever p is true at S (w ). Note, however, that S cannot be an arbitrary function. Intuitionistic semantics have the feature that, for any formula φ and worlds w v ∈ W , if φ is true at w then it must also be true at v; that is, truth is monotone (with respect to ). If we want this property to be preserved by formulas involving , then we need for and S to satisfy certain confluence properties. In the literature, one generally considers frames satisfying (1) w v implies S (w ) S (v) (forward confluence, or simply confluence), and (2) if u S (w ), there is v w such that S (v) = u (backward confluence) (see Figure 1 ). We will call frames satisfying these conditions persistent frames (see Section 3), mainly due to the fact that they are closely related to (persistent) products of modal logics [30] . Persistent frames for intuitionistic LTL are closely related to the frames of the modal logic LTL × S4, which is non-axiomatizable. For this reason, it may not be surprising that it is unknown whether the intuitionistic temporal logic of persistent frames, which we denote ITL p , is decidable. Fig. 1 . On a dynamic poset, the above diagrams can always be completed if S is forward or backward confluent, respectively. Posets with both properties are persistent.
However, as we will see in Proposition 2.1, only forward confluence is needed for truth of all formulas to be monotone, even in the presence of , or even U and R. The frames satisfying this condition are, instead, related to expanding products of modal logics [20] , which are often decidable even when the corresponding product is non-axiomatizable. This suggests that dropping the backwards confluence could also lead to a more manageable intuitionistic temporal logic. We denote the resulting logic by ITL e and, as we will prove in this article, it enjoys a crucial advantage over ITL p : ITL e has the effective finite model property (hence it is decidable), but ITL p does not. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, ITL e is the first known decidable intuitionistic temporal logic that (1) is conservative over propositional intuitionistic logic, (2) includes (or can define) the three tenses , U, R, and (3) is interpreted over infinite time.
Intuitively, ITL p is a logic of invertible processes, while ITL e reasons about non-invertible ones. The latter is closely related to ITL c , an intuitionistic temporal logic for continuous dynamic topological systems [18] . In contrast, the logic ITL e is based on relational, rather than topological, semantics, which has the advantage of admitting a natural "henceforth" operator (although topological variants can be defined [6] ). The current work extends previous results regarding a variant of ITL e with and , rather than U and R [5] .
Note that φ ≡ ¬ ¬φ is not valid intuitionistically and hence cannot be defined in terms of using the standard equivalence. The same situation holds for the "until" operator: while the language with and U is equally expressive to classical monadic first-order logic with ≤ over N [19] , U admits a first-order definable intuitionistic dual, R ("release"), which cannot be defined in terms of U using the classical definition.
However, this is not enough to conclude that R cannot be defined in a different way in terms of U. Thus, we will consider the question of definability: which of the modal operators can be defined in terms of the others? As is well-known, φ ≡ U φ and φ ≡ ⊥ R φ; these equivalences remain valid in the intuitionistic setting. Nevertheless, we will show that cannot be defined in terms of U, and cannot be defined in terms of R; to prove this, we will develop a theory of bisimulations on ITL e models.
Layout
The article is organised as follows: In Section 2, we present the syntax and the semantics in terms of dynamic posets and also study the validity of some of the classical axioms in our setting. In Section 3, we present the concepts of stratified and expanding frames and also show that satisfiability and validity on arbitrary models is equivalent to satisfiability and validity on expanding models. In Section 4, we consider two smaller classes of models, persistent and here-and-there models, and we compare their logics to ITL e . The Finite Model Property of ITL e is studied along Sections 5 and 6. In the former, we introduce the concepts of labelled structures and quasimodels as well as several related concepts such as immersions, condensations, and normalised quasimodels. Those definitions are used in Section 6 to prove the finite model property of ITL e . In Section 7, we define the concept of bounded bisimulations in intuitionistic modal setting and use them to study the interdefinability of the ITL e modalities in Section 8. We finish the article with conclusions and future work.
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS
We will work in sublanguages of the language L given by the following grammar:
where p is an element of a countable set of propositional variables P . Henceforth, we adhere to the standard conventions for omission of parentheses. All sublanguages we will consider include all Boolean operators and , hence we denote them by displaying the additional connectives as a subscript: for example, L denotes the U-free, R-free fragment. As an exception to this general convention, L denotes the fragment without , , U, or R.
Given any formula φ, we define the length of φ (in symbols, |φ|) recursively as follows:
Broadly speaking, the length of a formula φ corresponds to the number of connectives appearing in φ.
Dynamic Posets
Formulas of L are interpreted over dynamic posets. A dynamic poset is a tuple D = (W , , S ), where W is a non-empty set of states, is a partial order, and S is a function from W to W satisfying the forward confluence condition that for all w, v ∈ W , if w v then S (w ) S (v). An intuitionistic dynamic model, or simply model, is a tuple M = (W , , S, V ) consisting of a dynamic poset equipped with a valuation function V : W −→ ℘ (P ) that is monotone in the sense that for all
In the standard way, we define S 0 (w ) = w and, for all k ≥ 0, S k+1 (w ) = S (S k (w )). Then, we define the satisfaction relation inductively by:
See Figure 2 for illustration of the " " relation. Given a model M = (W , , S, V ) and w ∈ W , we write Σ M (w ) for the set ψ ∈ Σ M, w ψ ; the subscript "M" is omitted when it is clear from the context. , where is the reflexive and transitive closure of the relation indicated by the solid arrows, S is the relation indicated by the dashed arrows, and a black dot indicates that the variable p is true, so that we only have p ∈ V (y). Then, the reader may verify that M,
A formula φ is satisfiable over a class Ω of models if there is a model M ∈ Ω and a world w so that M, w φ, and valid over Ω if, for every world w of every model M ∈ Ω, we have that M, w φ. Satisfiability (respectively, validity) over the class of all intuitionisitic dynamic models is called satisfiability (respectively, validity) for the expanding domain intuitionisitic temporal logic ITL e . We will justify this terminology in the next section. First, we remark that dynamic posets impose the minimal conditions on S and to preserve the monotonicity of truth of formulas, in the sense that if M, w φ and w v, then M, v φ. Below, we will use the notation φ = {w ∈ W | M, w φ}.
is a poset and S : W → W is any function. Then, the following are equivalent:
(1) S is forward confluent; (2) for every valuation V on D and every formula φ, truth of φ is monotone with respect to .
Proof. That (1) implies (2) follows by a standard structural induction on φ. The case where φ ∈ P follows from the condition on V and most inductive steps are routine. Consider the case where φ = ψ U θ , and suppose that w v and w ∈ φ . Then there exists k ∈ N such that M, S k (w ) θ and for all i ∈ [0, k ), M, S i (w ) ψ . Since S is confluent, an easy induction shows that, for all i ∈ [0, k], S i (w ) S i (v). Therefore, from the induction hypothesis, we obtain that M, S k (v) θ and for all i ∈ [0, k ), M, S i (v) ψ . Other cases are either similar or easier. Now, we prove that (2) implies (1) by contrapositive. Suppose that (W , , S ) is not forwardconfluent, so that there are w v such that S (w ) S (v). Choose p ∈ P and define V (u) = {p} if S (w ) u, V (u) = ∅ otherwise. It follows from the transitivity of that V is monotone. However, p V (S (v)), from which it follows that (D, V ), w p but (D, V ), v p.
Observe that satisfiability in propositional intuitionistic logic is equivalent to satisfiability in classical propositional logic. This is because, if φ is classically satisfiable, it is trivially intuitionistically satisfiable in a one-world model; conversely, if φ is intuitionistically satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a finite model, hence in a maximal world of that finite model, and the generated submodel of a maximal world is a classical model. Thus, it may be surprising that the same is not the case for intuitionistic temporal logic: Proposition 2.2. Any formula φ of the temporal language that is classically satisfiable is satisfiable in a dynamic poset. However, there is a formula satisfiable on a dynamic poset that is not classically satisfiable.
Proof. If φ is satisfied on a classical LTL model M, then we may regard M as an intuitionistic model by letting be the identity. However, consider the formula ¬ p ∧ ¬ ¬ p (recall that ¬θ is a shorthand for θ → ⊥). Classically, this formula is equivalent to ¬ p ∧ p, and hence unsatisfiable. Define a model M = (W , , S, V ), whereW = {w, v, u}, x y if x = y or x = v, y = u, Fig. 3 . A dynamic intuitionistic model. As in the previous figure, solid arrows represent the intuitionistic order , dashed arrows the successor relation S, the black point satisfies the atom p, and no point satisfies any other atom. Note that S is forward, but not backward, confluent. The world w satisfies ¬ p ∧ ¬ ¬p. Figure 3 ). Then, one can check that M, w ¬ p ∧ ¬ ¬ p.
Hence, the decidability of the intuitionistic satisfiability problem is not a corollary of the classical case. In Section 6, we will prove that both the satisfiability and the validity problems are decidable. We will prove this by showing that ITL e has the effective finite model property: Recall that a logic Λ has the effective finite model property for a class of models Ω if there is a computable function f : N → N such that given a formula φ, we have that φ is satisfiable (falsifiable) on Ω if and only if there is M ∈ Ω such that φ is satisfied (falsified) on M and whose domain has at most f (|φ|) elements.
Some Valid and Non-valid ITL e Formulas
In this section, we present some examples of valid formulas that will be useful throughout the text. We begin by focusing on formulas of L . Proposition 2.3. The following formulas are ITL e -valid:
Proof. We prove that (4) holds and leave other items to the reader. Let M = (W , , S, V ) be any dynamic model and w ∈ W be such that
Note that, unlike the other items, (4) is not a biconditional, and indeed the converse is not valid over the class of all dynamic posets (see Proposition 4.2). Next, we show that φ (respectively, φ) can be defined in terms of U (respectively, R) and the LTL axioms involving U and R are also valid in our setting: Proposition 2.4. The following formulas are ITL e -valid:
Proof. We consider some cases below. For (1), from left to right, let us assume that M, w φ Uψ . Therefore, there exists The remaining items are left to the reader.
With these equivalences in mind, we can simplify the syntax of the full language L.
Proposition 2.5. The languages L R and L U are expressively equivalent to L over the class of dynamic posets.
Nevertheless, we will later show that both L U and L R are strictly less expressive than the full language, in contrast to the classical case.
THE EXPANDING MODEL PROPERTY
As mentioned in the Introduction, the logic ITL e is closely related to expanding products of modal logics [20] . In this subsection, we introduce stratified and expanding frames, and show that satisfiability and validity on arbitrary models is equivalent to satisfiability and validity on expanding models. To do this, it is convenient to represent posets using acyclic graphs. Definition 3.1. A directed acyclic graph is a tuple (W , ↑), where W is a set of vertices and ↑ ⊆ W × W is a set of edges whose reflexive, transitive closure ↑ * is antisymmetric. We will tacitly identify (W , ↑) with the poset (W , ↑ * ). A path from w 1 to w 2 is a finite sequence v 0 . . .v n ∈ W such that v 0 = w 1 , v n = w 2 and for all k < n, v k ↑ v k+1 . A tree is an acyclic graph (W , ↑) with an element r ∈ W , called the root, such that for all w ∈ W there is a unique path from r to w. A poset (W , ) is also a tree if there is a relation ↑ on W × W such that (W , ↑) is a tree and = ↑ * . Below, if R ⊆ A × A is a binary relation and X ⊆ A, then R X denotes the restriction of R to X . Similarly, if f : A −→ B, then f X denotes the restriction of f to the domain X .
If M is stratified, then we write n , S n , and V n instead of W n , S W n , and V W n . We then define M n = (W n , n , V n ). If, moreover, we have that S (w ) S (v) implies w v, then we say that M is an expanding model. We define stratified and expanding posets similarly, ignoring the clauses for V .
Below, if Σ ⊆ Δ ⊆ L, then we write Σ Δ to indicate that Σ is finite and closed under subformulas. In view of Proposition 2.5, in this section, we may restrict our attention to L U . Given Σ L U , a model M = (W , , S, V ), and a state w ∈ W , we will construct a stratified model M e = (W e , e , S e , V e ) such that for the root w e of W e 0 , Σ(w e ) = Σ(w ). Definition 3.3. Let Σ L U and M = (W , , S, V ) be a model. We first define the set D = N × N × ℘ (Σ) of possible defects, and fix an enumeration ((x k , y k , H k )) k ∈N of D; since Σ is finite and not empty, we assume that D is enumerated such that for each k > 0,
The model M e is defined from these tuples and the whole construction proceeds as follows:
See Figure 4 for an illustration of the construction. We wish to prove that the structure M e is a stratified model. To do this, we first establish some basic properties of the finite stages of the construction. We begin with some simple observations.
Proof. These claims are proven by a straightforward induction on k. Assume that all claims hold for i < k. If (a, b) ∈ U k , then either a = k, or k > 0 and (a, b) ∈ U k−1 . In the former case, we trivially have a = k ≤ k and in the latter a ≤ k − 1 by the induction hypothesis, establishing (1). For (2), if (a, b) ∈ U k−1 , then the claim follows easily from the induction hypothesis. Otherwise, a = k. Then, from y ≤ b ≤ b + n , we see that (a, b + n ) ∈ U k for all n , so that from the definition of S e , we obtain (S e ) n (a, b)
With this, we establish some properties of ↑ e k .
Proof. We proceed by induction on k. The base case, k = 0, is proved by using the fact that ↑ 0 = ∅, so the antecedent is always false. For the inductive step, let us assume that the lemma holds for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k, and we will prove the lemma for k + 1. To do so, let us take (a, b),
, then the induction hypothesis immediately yields all desired properties.
Otherwise, conditions (D1) and (D2) hold, so that (x, y) :
, by the confluence condition for M and a straightforward secondary induction on d, h k+1 (x, d ) h k+1 (c, d ), establishing (6) .
With this, we may begin proving some properties of the model M e = (W e , e , S e , V e ). We start by considering the function h.
Proof. By Lemma 3.4.3, h k : U k → W is a function for all k, and since W e = k ∈N U k and h = k ∈N h k with the union being increasing, we have that h : W e → W . Then, we have that 
Proof. If (x, y) e (x , y ), then (x, y)(↑ e ) (x , y ). Let n in N and (x 0 , y 0 ), . . . , (x n , y n ) in W e be such that (x 0 , y 0 ) = (x, y), (x n , y n ) = (x , y ) and for all nonnegative integers i < n,
To see that (1) holds, note that by Lemma 3.5.2, for all i < n, x i < x i+1 and y i = y i+1 . Since (x 0 , y 0 ) = (x, y) and (x n , y n ) = (x , y ), therefore x ≤ x and y = y . For (2), by Lemma 3.5.4, we have that for all nonnegative integers i < n, (x i , y i + 1) ↑ k i (x i+1 , y i+1 + 1), so that the sequence ((x i , y i + 1)) i <n witnesses that S e (x, y) = (x, y + 1) e (x , y + 1) = S e (x , y ). That (3) holds follows from similar considerations using Lemma 3.5.5.
To establish (4), we consider the following two cases. If n = 0, then (x, y) = (x , y ). Thus, h(x, y) h(x , y ), since is reflexive. Otherwise, n ≥ 1. Hence, by Lemma 3.5.6, for all nonnega-
Finally, we show that ↑ e is suitable for producing a stratified model.
Proof. That (W e , ↑ e ) is acyclic is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.5.2. The second claim follows by induction on a. Suppose that (a, b) ∈ W e . If a = 0, then once again by Lemma 3.5.2 (0, b) has no predecessors and hence the singleton
With this, we are ready to show that M e is expanding and satisfies (falsifies) the same formulae as (M, w ). Proof. First, we check that M e is a model. It is easy to see using Lemma 3.7.1 that e is antisymmetric, hence a partial order, since it is already a transitive, reflexive closure. For the monotonicity condition, suppose that (x, y) e (x , y ). By Lemma 3.7.4, h(x, y) h(x , y ) and by the monotonicity condition for M, Proof. The proof is by induction on the size ψ of the formula. The cases for propositional variables, falsum, conjunctions, and disjunctions are straightforward. For the temporal modalities, recall that for all (x, y) ∈ W e and all n ∈ N, (S e ) n (x, y) = (x, y + n) ∈ W e , so that by Lemma 3.6, h(x, y + n) = S n (h(x, y)), which allows us to easily apply the induction hypothesis.
Finally, for implication, suppose first that M e , (x, y)
Let k be such that (x k , y k , H k ) = (x, y, Σ(v )); then, v witnesses that (D2) holds, and since x ≤ k, condition (D1) holds too. Hence, there is (x , y ) ∈ W e such that Σ(h(x , y )) = Σ(v ) and (x, y) ↑ e (x , y ), which implies that (x, y) e (x , y ). By induction hypothesis, M e , (x , y ) ψ 1 and M e , (x , y ) ψ 2 , hence M e , (x, y) ψ 1 → ψ 2 .
In conclusion, we obtain the following: Theorem 3.11. A formula φ is satisfiable (respectively, falsifiable) on an intuitionistic dynamic model if and only if it is satisfiable (respectively, falsifiable) on an expanding model.
SPECIAL CLASSES OF FRAMES
As we have seen in Propositon 2.1, the class of dynamic posets is the widest class of posets equipped with a function that satisfy truth monotonicity under the classical interpretation of the temporal modalities. However, in the literature one often considers smaller classes of frames. In this section, we will discuss persistent and here-and-there models, and compare their logics to ITL e .
Persistent Frames
Expanding models were introduced as a weakening of product models, and thus it is natural to also consider a variant of ITL e interpreted over "standard" product models, or over the somewhat wider class of persistent models.
, then we say that S is backward confluent. If S is both forward and backward confluent, then we say that it is persistent. A tuple (W , , S ) where S is persistent is a persistent intuitionistic temporal frame, and the set of valid formulas over the class of persistent intuitionistic temporal frames is denoted ITL p , or persistent domain ITL.
See Figure 1 for an illustration of backwards confluence. The name "persistent" comes from the fact that Theorem 3.11 can be modified to obtain a stratified model M where S : W k → W k+1 is an isomorphism, i.e. whose domains are persistent with respect to S , although we will not elaborate on this issue here. Next, we remark that ITL e ITL p , given the following claim proven in Reference [6] .
Over the class of persistent models this property will allow us to "push down" all occurrences of to the propositional level. Say that a formula φ is in -normal form if all occurrences of are of the form i p, with p a propositional variable.
Proof. The claim can be proven by structural induction using the validities in Propositions 2.3, 4.2, and 2.4.
We remark that the only reason that this argument does not apply to arbitrary ITL e models is the fact that ( φ → ψ ) → (φ → ψ ) is not valid in general (Proposition 4.2). Next, we show that the finite model property fails over the class of persistent models, using the following formula. Proof. Consider the model M = (W , , S, V ), where W = Z ∪ {r } with r a fresh world not in Z, w v if and only if w = r or w = v, S (r ) = r and S (n) = n + 1 for n ∈ Z, and p = [0, ∞). It is readily seen that M is a persistent model, that M, r ¬¬ p (since every world above r satisfies p), yet M, r ¬¬ p, since there is no n such that M, S n (r ) ¬¬ p. It follows that M, r φ, and hence φ is not valid, as claimed.
Lemma 4.5. The formula φ (from Lemma 4.4) is valid over the class of finite, persistent models.
Since u was arbitrary, we easily obtain M, w ¬¬ p, as desired.
The following is then immediate from Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5:
Theorem 4.6. ITL p does not have the finite model property.
Thus, our decidability proof for ITL e , which proceeds by first establishing an effective finite model property, will not carry over to ITL p . Whether ITL p is decidable remains open.
Temporal Here-and-There Models
An even smaller class of models that, nevertheless, has many applications is that of temporal hereand-there models [3, 8] . Some of the results we will present here apply to this class, so it will be instructive to review it. The logic of here-and-there is the maximal logic strictly between classical and intuitionistic propositional logic, given by a frame {0, 1} with 0 1. This logic is axiomatized by adding to intuitionistic propositional logic the axiom p ∨ (p → q) ∨ ¬q.
A temporal here-and-there frame is a persistent frame that is "locally" based on this frame. To be precise: The prototypical example is the frame (W , , S ), where W = N × {0, 1}, (i, j) (i , j ) if i = i and j ≤ j , and S (i, j) = (i + 1, j). Note, however, that our definition allows for other examples (see Figure 8 ). We will denote the resulting logic by ITL ht . In its propositional flavour, here-and-there logic plays a crucial role in the definition of Equilibrium Logic [39, 40] , a well-known characterisation of Stable Model [21] and Answer Set [34, 37] semantics for logic programs. Modal extensions of this aforementioned superintuitionistic logic made it possible to extend those existent logic programming paradigms with new constructs, allowing their use in different scenarios where describing and reasoning with temporal [8] or epistemic [17] data is necessary. A combination of propositional here-and-there with LTL was axiomatized by Balbiani and Diéguez [3] , who also show that cannot be defined in terms of , a result we will strengthen here to show that cannot be defined even in terms of U. It is also claimed in Reference [3] that is not definable in terms of over the class of here-and-there models, but as we will see in Proposition 8.3, this claim is incorrect.
COMBINATORICS OF INTUITIONISTIC MODELS
In this section, we introduce some combinatorial tools we will need to prove that ITL e has the effective finite model property, and hence is decidable. We begin by discussing labelled structures, which allow for a graph-theoretic approach to intuitionistic models.
Labelled Structures and Quasimodels
Definition 5.1. Given a set Λ whose elements we call "labels" and a set W , a Λ-labelling function on W is any function λ : W → Λ. A structure S = (W , R, λ) where W is a set, R ⊆ W × W and λ is a labelling function on W is a Λ-labelled structure, where "structure" may be replaced with "poset," "directed graph," and so on.
A useful measure of the complexity of a labelled poset or graph is given by its level:
Definition 5.2. Given a labelled poset A = (W , , λ) and an element w ∈ W , an increasing chain from w of length n is a sequence v 1 . . .v n of elements of W such that v 1 
and denote the resulting model by A mod .
If M = (W , , V ) is a model, then it can easily be checked that for all w, v ∈ W , if w v, then Σ(w ) ⊆ Σ(v). Note that not every ℘ (Σ)-labelled poset is of the form M Σ , as it has to satisfy additional conditions according to the semantics. In particular, we are interested in labelled posets that respect the intuitionistic implication:
If further (W , ) is a tree, then we say that A is tree-like.
Simulations, Immersions and Condensations
As is well-known, truth in intuitionistic models is preserved by bisimulation, and thus this is usually the appropriate notion of equivalence between different models. However, it will also be convenient to consider a weaker notion, which we call bimersion. A simulation is called a (partial) immersion if it is a (partial) function. If an immersion σ : W A → W B exists, then we write A B. If, moreover, there is an immersion τ : W B → W A , then we say that they are bimersive, write A B, and call the pair See Figure 5 for an example of a condensation. Note that the relation is an equivalence relation. In this text, simulations will always be between posets. In the case that A or B is an acyclic directed graph, a simulation between A and B will be one between their respective transitive, reflexive closures. It will typically be convenient to work with immersions rather than simulations; however, as the next lemma shows, not much generality is lost by this restriction. Proof. By a straightforward induction on the depth of w ∈ W A , we show that if w σ w then there is a partial immersion σ w with w ∈ dom(σ w ), whose domain is the subtree generated by w, and such that σ w (w ) = w . Let D be set of daughters of w, and for each v ∈ D, choose v so that v σ v and w B v . By the induction hypothesis, there is a partial immersion σ v with v ∈ dom(σ v ). Then, one readily checks that {(w, w )} ∪ v ∈D σ v is also an immersion, as needed.
Condensations are useful for producing (small) quasimodels out of models.
It follows that φ ∈ λ A (ρ (v)) and ψ λ A (ρ (v)), and since ρ is an immersion we also have that w = ρι(w ) A ρ (v), as needed.
Normalized Labelled Trees
To count the number of different labelled trees up to bimersion, we construct, for any set Λ of labels and any k ≥ 1, the labelled directed acyclic graph G Λ k = W Λ k , ↑ Λ k , λ Λ k by induction on k as follows.
Base case.
is typically not a tree, but we may unravel it to obtain one. Definition 5.8. Given a labelled directed graph G = (W , ↑, λ) and w ∈ W , the unravelling of G from w is the labelled tree ur w (G) = (ur w (W ), ur w (↑), ur w (λ)) such that ur w (W ) is the set of all the paths in G starting on w, ξ ur w (↑) ζ if and only if there is v ∈ W such that ζ = ξv, and
Proposition 5.9. For any rooted labelled tree T over a set Λ of labels, if the level of T is finite then there is a condensation from T to ur y (G Λ lev(T) ) for some y ∈ W Λ lev(T) . Proof. Let T = (W T , ↑ T , λ T ) be a labelled tree with root r . We write ≺ T for the transitive closure of ↑ T and T for the reflexive closure of ≺ T . The proof is by induction on the level n = lev(T) of T. For n = 1, observe that this means that λ T (w ) = λ(r ) for all w ∈ W T . Let ρ = W T × {λ T (r )} and ι = {(λ T (r ), r )}. It can easily be checked that (ρ, ι) is a condensation. 2 For n > 1, suppose the property holds for all rooted labelled trees T such that lev(T ) < n. Define the following sets:
Note that if w ∈ N , then lev(w ) < lev(r ), and therefore lev(w ) < n; hence, by induction, there is a condensation (ρ w , ι w ) from the subgraph of T generated by w to ur y w (G Λ n−1 ) for some y w ∈ W Λ n−1 . Define s = (λ(r ), y w w ∈ N ) ∈ W Λ n and consider the unravelling U = (W U , ↑ U , λ U ) of G Λ n from s. Note that ur y w (G Λ n−1 ) embeds into U via the map ξ → sξ , and with this we define ρ w : W T → W U by ρ w = sρ w , and similarly define ι w : W U → W T by ι w (sξ ) = ι w (ξ ) (i.e., ι w first removes the first element of a string and then applies ι w ).
We then define
Then, it can readily be checked that ρ is an immersion from T to U,ι is a simulation from U to T and ι ⊆ ρ −1 . Using Lemma 5.6, we can then choose an immersion ι ⊆ι, so that (ρ, ι) is a condensation from T to U. Finally, given n, k ∈ N let us recursively define natural numbers E n k and Q n k by:
The following lemma can be proven by a straightforward induction, left to the reader.
Lemma 5.10. For any finite set Λ with cardinality n and all k ∈ N, (1) the size of G Λ k is bounded by E n k , and (2) the size of any unravelling of G Λ k is bounded by Q n k . From this and Proposition 5.9, we obtain the following: Theorem 5.11.
(1) Given a set of labels Λ and a Λ-labelled tree T of level k < ω, there is a Λ-labelled tree T bounded by Q |Λ | k such that T T. We call T the normalized Λ-labelled tree for T.
Proof. In view of Proposition 5.9, way may take T to be a suitable unravelling of G Λ k , establishing the first claim. For the second, by Lemma 5.10, G Λ k has size at most E |Λ | k . Since the unravellings of any graph are determined by their starting point, there must be i < j ≤ n with T i and T j bimersive to the same unravelling of G Λ k , from which it follows that T i and T j are bimersive. The second item may be viewed as a finitary variant of Kruskal's theorem for labelled trees [28] . When applied to quasimodels, we obtain the following:
(1) Given a tree-like Σ-quasimodel T, there is a tree-like Σ-quasimodel T Σ T bounded by Q 2 s s+1 . We call T the normalized Σ-quasimodel for T. (2) Given a sequence of tree-like Σ-quasimodels T 1 , . . . , T n with n > E 2 s s+1 , there are indexes i < j ≤ n such that T i T j .
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 5.7 and Theorem 5.11 using the fact that any Σ-quasimodel has level at most s + 1.
Finally, we obtain an analogous result for pointed structures.
Definition 5.13. A pointed labelled poset is a structure (W , , λ, w ) consisting of a labelled tree with a designated world w ∈ W . Given a labelled poset A = (W A , A , λ A ) and w ∈ W A , we denote by A w the pointed labelled poset given by
The notions of pointed immersion, pointed condensation, and so on, are defined analogously to Definition 5.5. Lemma 5.14. If Λ has n elements, then any pointed Λ-labelled poset of level at most k condenses to a labelled pointed tree bounded by Q 2n k+2 , and there are at most E 2n k+2 bimersion classes. Proof. We may view a pointed labelled poset A = (W , , λ, w ) as a (non-pointed) labelled poset as follows. Let Λ = Λ × {0, 1}. Then, set λ (v) = (λ(v), 0) if v w, λ (w ) = (λ(w ), 1). Note that if A had level k according to λ it may now have level k + 2 according to λ , since if u ≺ w ≺ v, we may have that λ(u) = λ(w ) = λ(v) yet λ (u) λ (w ) and λ (w ) λ (v). By Proposition 5.9, A condenses to a generated tree T of G Λ k+2 by some condensation (ρ, ι). Let w = ρ (w ), and consider T as a pointed structure with distinguished point w . Given that ρ is a surjective, label-preserving Fig. 6 . The stratum M a and two of its eventualities. The fulfillment of (w, φ) is displayed, as well as the initial portion of the fulfillment of (w , φ ). function, w, w are the only points whose label has second component 1, and therefore (ρ, ι) must be a pointed condensation, as claimed.
With this, we may give an analogue of Proposition 5.12 tailored for pointed quasimodels. Its proof is essentially the same. (1) Given a tree-like pointed Σ-quasimodel T and a formula φ, there is a tree-like pointed Σquasimodel T T bounded by Q 2 s +1 s+3 . We call T the normalized pointed Σ-quasimodel for T.
(2) Given a sequence of tree-like pointed Σ-quasimodels T 1 , . . . ,
With these tools at hand, we are ready to prove that ITL e has the effective finite model property, and hence is decidable.
THE FINITE MODEL PROPERTY
In view of Proposition 2.5, to show that validity over L is decidable, it suffices to prove that validity is decidable over L U . Thus, in this section, we will restrict our attention to this sub-language. We will use the notions of eventuality and fulfilment, defined below (see also Figure 6 ). (with parameters a, b, relative 
s+3 . The bound (1) will naturally arise throughout our construction, but the only relevance is that it is computable. We construct M as a speedup of M, in a sense that we make precise next. 
We may omit mention of the parameters if we wish to leave them unspecified, e.g., N is a speedup of M from a if there exist b, b such that N is a speedup of M from a taking b to b .
Then, the following speedups are defined for any stratified model M = (W , , S, V ) and any finite, non-empty set of formulas Σ closed under subformulas. In each case, if M = (W , , S, V ) is a stratified model, we will produce another stratified model M = (W , , S , V ) and a map π :
denotes the k th stratum of M. 
The map π is the identity on W i = W i for i k, and π (w ) = ι(w ) for w ∈ W T . (su2) Replace (M k , w ) with a copy of its normalized, pointed Σ-quasimodel, where k ≥ 0 and w ∈ W k . The transformation is similar to the previous one except that (M k , w ) is regarded as a pointed structure with distinguished point w.
The map π is the identity on
The transformation is defined as the previous one. Lemma 6.4. Let a < k < ≤ b be natural numbers and suppose that M is such that one of the transformations (su1)-(su4) applies. Then, the result M is a speedup of M between a and b such that Σ M (π (w )) = Σ M (w ) for any w ∈ W . In the cases (su3) and (su4), the speedup is strict.
Proof. The proof that M = (W , , S , V ) is a speedup of M = (W , , S, V ) consists of checking that Definition 6.3 applies and is left to the reader. We prove by structural induction on φ that for all transformations, all w ∈ W and all φ ∈ Σ, M , w φ iff M, π (w ) φ.
We only detail the case for φ = ψ in the sub-case when M k is replaced with a copy of the normalized Σ-quasimodel T of M k and w ∈ W k−1 . Suppose that w ∈ W k−1 and M, π (w ) ψ . Then, ψ ∈ Σ M (Sπ (w )). Since S (w ) = ρSπ (w ), πS (w ) = ιS (w ), and (ρ, ι) is a condensation, Σ M (Sπ (w )) = λ T (S (w )) = Σ M (πS (w )). In particular, ψ ∈ Σ M (πS (w )), so that M, πS (w ) ψ . By induction hypothesis, M , S (w ) ψ . Hence, M , w ψ . The other direction is similar. The remaining two sub-cases for φ = ψ are when w ∈ W k and when w W k−1 ∪ W k , both of which are treated similarly. The cases for the other temporal modalities also follow from similar considerations (see also the proof of Lemma 6.12). The cases for the implication are similar to those in the proof of Proposition 5.7, and the remaining cases are straightforward. We leave the details to the reader.
The purpose of the transformations (su2) and (su4) is to preserve fulfillments of formulas. We make this precise in the next lemma. φ) is an eventuality of M with fulfillment w = w 0 , . . . ,w n .
(1) If k ≤ n and M is obtained by replacing (M a+k , w k ) by (T, v), then (w, φ) is an eventuality of M and the fulfillment of (w, φ) is v 0 , . . . ,v n with v k = v and otherwise v i = w i . (2) If k < ≤ n and M is obtained by replacing (M a+ , w ) by (M a+k , w k ), then (w, φ) is an eventuality of M and the fulfillment of (w, φ) is w 0 , . . . ,w k , w +1 , . . . w n .
The proof is straightforward and left to the reader. In the next few lemmas, we show that models can always be sped up so that fulfillment times are effectively bounded. Lemma 6.6. Fix Σ L U with s = |Σ| and let M be any startified model and a < b be natural numbers. Then there is a speedup of M of M from a taking b to some b ≤ a + E 2 s s+1 , and such that M i is bounded by Q 2 s s+1 for all i ∈ (a, b ). Proof. Let b be minimal such that some model N is a speedup of M from a taking b to b . We claim that b ≤ a + E 2 s s+1 ; for otherwise, by Theorem 5.11.2 there are natural numbers i, j with a < i < j ≤ b such that N i Σ N j , and hence we can apply a transformation (su3) to obtain some speedup N of N from a taking b to some b < b ; but then clearly N is also a speedup of M from a taking b to b and b < b , a contradiction.
Thus, b ≤ a + E 2 s s+1 , and finally we obtain M by replacing each N x with x ∈ (a, b ) by its normalized Σ-quasimodel, which by Proposition 5.12 is bounded by Q 2 s s+1 . Lemma 6.7. Fix a finite set Σ L U with s = |Σ| and let M = (W , , S, V ) be any stratified model, a ∈ N, and U ⊆ W a × Σ be a finite set of eventualities. Then there is a speedup N of M from a such that the fulfillment time of U in N satisfies (1) ≤ |U |E 2 s +1 s+3 , and (2) for all x ∈ [1, − a) , N a+x is bounded by Q 2 s +1 s+3 .
Proof. By induction on |U |. The claim is vacuously true if U = ∅. Otherwise, let n + 1 = |U | and (w, φ) ∈ U and assume inductively that a speedup M of M from a is given so that the fulfilment
s+3 and for all x < − a, N a+1+x is bounded by Q 2 s +1 s+3 . Let N be a speedup of M from a + chosen so that the fulfilment time r of (w, φ) in N is least among all such speedups. We claim that r ≤ (n + 1)E 2 s +1 s+3 . If not, then let w 0 , . . . ,w r be the fulfilment path for (w, φ), and for x ∈ [1, r − ] let N + +x be the pointed submodel (N +x , w +x ). Note that r − > E 2 s +1 s+3 , so that by Proposition 5.15 there are x, y ∈ N such that 0 < x < y ≤ r − and N + +x Σ N + +y . Thus, we can apply a transformation (su4) and replace N + +y by N + +x to obtain a speedup N of N. By Lemma 6.5, the fulfilment of (w, φ) in N is w 0 , . . . ,w +x , w +y+1 , . . . ,w r , so that (w, φ) has fulfilment time r − (y − x ), contradicting the minimality of r .
Finally, we define N by replacing each (N +x , w +x ) with x ∈ [0, r − ) by its pointed, normalized Σ-quasimodel, which in view of Proposition 5.15 has size at most Q 2 s +1 s+3 and by Lemma 6.5 preserves the fulfilment time of (w, φ), as needed.
In the next lemmas, we construct a good model in three phases, each time obtaining more of the properties required by Definition 6.2. Below, if Σ L U and M = (W , , S, V ) is a stratified model and a ∈ N, we say that M a occurs infinitely often (with respect to Σ) if there are infinitely many values of i such that M a Σ M i . (1) M a occurs infinitely often and (2) for all i ≤ a the size of M i is bounded by Q 2 s s+1 . Proof. Suppose that φ is satisfiable (falsifiable). Then, by Theorem 3.11, φ is satisfied (falsified) on N 0 for some stratified model N. By Proposition 5.12 there are finitely many Σ equivalence classes, and hence there is some a such that N a occurs infinitely often.
By Lemma 6.6 there is a speedup M of N from 0 taking a to some a ≤ E 2 s s+1 and such that the size of M i is bounded by Q 2 s s+1 for all i ∈ (0, a). It is then easy to see that M a occurs infinitely often in M . Finally, we define M by replacing M 0 and M a by their normalized ℘ (Σ)-labelled trees, which by Proposition 5.12 have size at most Q 2 s s+1 . Lemma 6.9. Let Σ L U with s = |Σ| and φ ∈ Σ. Then φ is satisfiable (falsifiable) over the class of dynamic posets if and only if φ is satisfied in a stratified model M for which there exists a ≤ E 2 s s+1 such that (1) M a occurs infinitely often,
s+3 . Proof. In view of Lemma 6.8, we may assume that φ is satisfied (falsified) on N 0 for some expanding model N = (W , , S, V ) satisfying the first condition and such that for all i ≤ a the size of M i is bounded by Q 2 s s+1 . Let U ⊆ W a × Σ be the set of all eventualities of N a ; by Lemma 6.7 there is a speedup M of N from a such that the realization time of M a is bounded by |U |E 2 s +1 s+3 and such that M a+1+i is bounded by Q 2 s +1 s+3 for all i < r . Clearly |U | ≤ s |W a | ≤ sQ 2 s s+1 , giving us the second condition. Since for i ≤ a, we have that M i is bounded by Q 2 s s+1 ≤ Q 2 s +1 s+3 , we obtain the third condition.
Finally, we are able to show that satisfiability and validity can be restricted to good models. Proof. We may begin with a model N = (W , , S, V ) satisfying all conditions of Lemma 6.9, where N a occurs infinitely often and r is the realization time of W a . Since M a occurs infinitely often, we may choose b > a + r such that N a Σ N b . Then, by Lemma 6.6 there is a speedup M of N from a + r taking b to some b ≤ a + r + E 2 s +1 s+1 and such that M i is bounded by Q 2 s +1 s+1 (and hence by Q 2 s +1 s+3 ) for all i ∈ (a + r , b). The model M then has all desired properties. Definition 6.11. Let M be an expanding model such that there is an immersion σ :
to be the root of W 0 (note that w a←b 0 ∈ W a←b ).
The idea is to apply the operation · a←b to good models, in which case the end result is a wellbehaved finite model as described in the next lemma and Figure 7 . Proof. The proof that M a←b = (W a←b , a←b , S a←b , V a←b ) is a model is straightforward and left to the reader. We prove by structural induction on φ that for all w ∈ W a←b and all φ ∈ Σ, M a←b , w φ iff M, w φ. The cases for propositional variables and the Boolean connectives are straightforward. The case for the "next" temporal modality is similar to that in the proof of Lemma 6.4.
For the "henceforth" and "until" temporal modalities, suppose first that (w, φ) is an eventuality in M and w ∈ W a←b . Let w 0 . . . w n be the fulfilment of (w, φ) in M. If w n ∈ W a←b , then we can apply the induction hypothesis to see that each w i for i ≤ n satisfies the progressive and the end conditions for (w, φ) in M a←b : if φ = θ Uψ then M, w n |= ψ and for all i < n M, w i |= θ and M, w i |= ψ , which by induction on formula length yields M a←b , w n |= ψ and for all i < n M a←b , w i |= θ . The case for φ = ψ is similar.
Otherwise, there is a least k ≤ n such that w k ∈ W b . Therefore, (w k , φ) is an eventuality in M and so is (σ (w k ), φ), since σ is an immersion. Since M is good, the length of the fulfilment of any eventuality (v, φ) such that v ∈ W a is bounded by b − a. Thus, by the previous case (where w n ∈ W a←b ), (σ (w k ), φ) is an eventuality in M a←b . Let v 0 , . . . ,v be its fulfilment. Then it is not hard to see using the induction hypothesis that w 0 , . . . ,w k−1 , v 0 , . . . ,v is the fulfilment of (w, φ) in M a←b , witnessing that M a←b , w |= φ.
Conversely, suppose now that (w, φ) is an eventuality in M a←b and let w 0 . . . w n be its fulfilment. For each k ≤ n let m k be such that w k ∈ W m k . The proof is by a subinduction on n. For the base case, we directly apply the induction hypothesis to w = w n . If n > 0, then first note that by the main induction hypothesis on φ, the sequence w 0 . . . w n satisfies the progressive condition for (w, φ) on M. Now consider two cases. If m 0 < b − 1, then m 1 < b. The sub-induction hypothesis tells us that (w 1 , φ) is an eventuality of M, and since M, w 0 satisfies the progressive condition for (w, φ) it follows that (w, φ) is an eventuality of M.
Otherwise, m 0 = b − 1, so that m 1 = a. The sub-induction hypothesis tells us that (w 1 , φ) is an eventuality of M. Since w 1 = S a←b (w 0 ) = σS (w 0 ) and σ is an immersion, (S (w 0 ), φ) is an eventuality in M. Therefore, (w, φ) is an eventuality in M. Lemma 6.13. If M is a good model with parameters a, b and s = |Σ|, then M a←b is bounded by
Proof. This is immediate from the definition of W a←b and the bounds on good models (see Defininition 6.2).
We have proven the following effective finite model property for L U ; however, since L maps effectively into L U , this result applies to the full language. As a corollary, we get the decidability of ITL e . Corollary 6.15. The satisfiability and validity problems for ITL e are decidable.
BOUNDED BISIMULATIONS FOR U AND R
In this section, we adapt the classical definition of bounded bisimulations for modal logic [4] to our case. To do so, we combine the ordinary definition of bounded bisimulations with the work of Reference [38] on bisimulations for propositional intuitionistic logic, which includes extra conditions involving the partial order . In our setting, we combine both approaches to define bisimulation for a language involving →, , U and R, where the latter are adapted from bisimulations for a language with until and since [26] presented by Kurtonina and de Rijke [29] . Since all languages we consider contain Booleans and , it is convenient to begin with a "basic" notion of bisimulation for this language. Definition 7.1. Given n > 0 and two ITL e models M 1 and M 2 , a sequence of binary relations Z n ⊆ · · · ⊆Z 0 ⊆ W 1 × W 2 is said to be a bounded -bisimulation if for all (w 1 , w 2 ) ∈ W 1 × W 2 and for all 0 ≤ i < n, the following conditions are satisfied:
Atoms. If w 1 Z i w 2 , then for all propositional variables p,
Forth . If w 1 Z i+1 w 2 , then S (w 1 ) Z i S (w 2 ).
Note that there is not "back" clause for ; this is simply because S is a function, so its "forth" and "back" clauses are identical. Bounded -bisimulations are useful, because they preserve the truth of relatively small L -formulas. Lemma 7.2. Given two ITL e models M 1 and M 2 and a bounded -bisimulation Z n ⊆ · · · ⊆Z 0 between them, for all i ≤ n and (w 1 ,
Proof. We proceed by induction on i. Let 0 ≤ i ≤ n be such that for all j < i the lemma holds. Let w 1 ∈ W 1 and w 2 ∈ W 2 be such that w 1 Z i w 2 and let us consider φ ∈ L such that |φ| ≤ i. The cases where φ is an atom or of the forms θ ∧ ψ , θ ∨ ψ are as in the classical case, and we omit them. Thus, we focus on the following:
Case φ = θ → ψ . We proceed by contrapositive to prove the left-to-right implication. Note that in this case, we must have i > 0.
Assume that M 2 , w 2 θ → ψ . Therefore, there exists v 2 ∈ W 2 such that v 2 w 2 , M 2 , v 2 θ , and M 2 , v 2 ψ . By the Back → condition, it follows that there exists v 1 ∈ W 1 such that v 1 w 1 and v 1 Z i−1 v 2 . Since |θ |, |ψ | < i, by the induction hypothesis, it follows that M 1 , v 1 θ and M 1 , v 1 ψ . Consequently, M 1 , w 1 θ → ψ . The converse direction is proved in a similar way but using Forth →.
Case φ = ψ . Once again, we have that i > 0. Assume that M 1 , w 1 ψ , so that M 1 , S (w 1 ) ψ . By Forth , S 1 (w 1 ) Z i−1 S 2 (w 2 ). Moreover, |ψ | ≤ i − 1, so that by the induction hypothesis, M 2 , S (w 2 ) ψ , and M 2 , w 2 ψ . The right-to-left direction is analogous.
We will use bounded -bisimulations as a basis to define bounded bisimulations for more powerful languages. The bisimulations we define below preserve formulas containing the "until" operator. Definition 7.3. Given n ∈ N and two ITL e models M 1 and M 2 , a bounded -bisimulation Z n ⊆ · · · ⊆Z 0 ⊆ W 1 × W 2 is said to be a bounded U-bisimulation iff for all (w 1 , w 2 ) ∈ W 1 × W 2 and 0 ≤ i < n such that w 1 Z i+1 w 2 :
Forth U. For all k 1 ≥ 0 there exist k 2 ≥ 0 and (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ W 1 × W 2 such that
Back U. For all k 2 ≥ 0 there exist k 1 ≥ 0 and (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ W 1 × W 2 such that
As was the case before, the following lemma states that two bounded U-bisimilar models agree on small-enough L U formulas. Lemma 7.4. Given two ITL e models M 1 and M 2 and a bounded U-bisimulation Z n ⊆ . . . ⊆Z 0 between them, for all m ≤ n and (w 1 ,
Proof. Once again, proceed by induction on n. Let m ≤ n be such that for all k < m the lemma holds. Let w 1 ∈ W 1 and w 2 ∈ W 2 be such that w 1 Z m w 2 and let us consider φ ∈ L U
DEFINABILITY AND UNDEFINABILITY OF MODAL OPERATORS
In this section, we explore the question of when the basic connectives can or cannot be defined in terms of each other. It is known that, classically, and are interdefinable, as are U and R; we will see that this is not the case intuitionistically. However, U (and hence R) is not definable in terms of , in the classical setting [26] , and this result immediately carries over to the intuitionistic setting, as the class of classical LTL models can be seen as the subclass of that of dynamic posets by letting the partial order be the identity.
It is worth noting that interdefinability of modal operators can vary within intermediate logics. For example, ∧, ∨, and → are basic connectives in propositional intuitionistic logic, but in the intermediate logic of here-and-there [22] , ∧ is a basic operator [1, 3] as is → [1], while ∨ is definable in terms of → and ∧ [32] . In first-order here-and-there [31] , the quantifier ∃ is definable in terms of ∀ and → [36] . In the modal case, Simpson [44] shows that modal operators are not interdefinable in the intuitionistic modal logic IK and Balbiani and Diéguez [3] proved that is not definable in terms of in the linear time temporal extension of here-and-there. This last proof is adapted here to show that not definable in terms of U in ITL ht either. Note, however, that here we correct the claim of Reference [3] stating that is not here-and-there definable in terms of , although we do show that is not definable in terms of R over the class of persistent models.
Let us begin by studying the definability of in terms of and U. Recall that L denotes the full language of intuitionistic temporal logic. If L ⊆ L, φ ∈ L and Ω is a class of models, then we say that φ is L -definable over Ω if there is φ ∈ L such that Ω |= φ ↔ φ . Thus, for example, p is L U -definable; however, as we will see, p is not.
We will show this by exhibiting models that are n-U-bisimilar for arbitrariliy large n. To construct these models, it will be convenient to introduce some ad-hoc notation for cyclic groups.
. Given n > 0, we will denote the cyclic group with n elements by Z/(n). We will identify it with the set {1, . . . , n}, and define [i] n to be the unique j ∈ [1, n] such that i ≡ j (mod n). Note that addition in Z/(n) is given by [x + y] n . With this, we are ready to show that is not definable in terms of U. Proof. For n > 0 consider a model M n = (W , , S, V ) with W = (Z/(n + 2)) × {0, 1}, (i, j)
Clearly M n is a here-and-there model. For m ≤ n, let ∼ m be the least equivalence relation such that (i, j) ∼ m (i , j ) whenever Figure 8 ). Then, it can easily be checked that M n , (1, 0) |= p, M, (1, 1) |= p, and (1, 0) ∼ m (1, 1) .
It remains to check that (∼ m ) m ≤n is a bounded U-bisimulation. The atoms, → and clauses are easily verified, so we focus on those for U. Since ∼ m is symmetric, we only check Forth U. Suppose that (i 1 , j 1 ) ∼ m (i 2 , j 2 ), and fix k 1 ≥ 0. Let i = [i 1 + k 1 ] n+2 and note that S k 1 (i 1 , j 1 ) = (i , j 1 ). Then, we can see that k 2 = 0, v 1 = (i , 1) and v 2 = (i 2 , j 2 ) witness that Forth U holds, where the intermediate condition for j 2 ∈ [0, k 2 ) holds vacuously, since [0, k 2 ) = ∅.
By letting n = |φ|, we see using Lemma 7.4 that that no L U -formula φ can be equivalent to p.
As a consequence: Our goal next is to show that the modality cannot be defined in terms of R over the class of persistent models. For this, we will use a model construction based on the last exponent of a number m > 0 in base 2, which we denote by (m); for example, 6 = 2 2 + 2 1 , so (6) = 1. Before we continue, let us establish some basic properties of the function . The following lemma is easily verified, and we present it without proof. From these properties, we obtain the following useful equality. Lemma 8.6. Let m ≥ 1, a ≥ 0 and k ∈ [1, 2 m ). Then, (a2 m + k ) = (k ).
Proof. If a = 0, then the claim is obvious. Otherwise, note that since k < 2 m , we have that (k ) ≤ m − 1. Then (a2 m ) = (a) + m ≥ m, so that (a2 m + k ) = min{ (a2 m ), (k )} = (k ).
With this, we are ready to define the models M n . See Figure 9 for an illustration of M 3 . The key properties of the model M n are that (1, 0) and (1, 1) are (n − 1)-R-bisimilar, yet they disagree on the truth of p. Let us begin by proving the latter. Lemma 8.8. Given n ≥ 0, M n , (1, 0) |= p and M n , (1, 1) |= p.
Proof. Let M n = (W , , S, V ). Note that M n , (1, 1) |= p, since (2 n , 1) = S 2 n (1, 0) and 1 > n − (2 n ), so that M n , (2 n , 1) |= p. However, if (i, j) = S k (1, 0), then j = 0 and i ∈ [1, 2 n ], so that by Lemma 8.5.3 (i) ≤ n and 0 ≤ n − (i). Hence, M n , S k (1, 0) |= p, and since k was arbitrary, M n , (1, 0) |= p.
Next, we will define a family of binary relations (∼ m ) m<n on M n , which will be used to show that (1, 0) and (1, 1) are n-R-bisimilar. These relations are defined using the notion of congruent blocks. r , ([x 1 + t] 2 n , x 2 ) ∼ m ([y 1 + t] 2 n , y 2 ); this is seen by noting that [x 1 + t] 2 n ≡ [y 1 + t] 2 n (mod 2 m ), and ([x 1 + t] 2 n , x 2 ), ([y 1 + t] 2 n , y 2 ) are both either on the first halves of B and B , or both on the second halves, or both on the successor of the second half; the minimality of r guarantees that no other case is possible.
If x is m-regular, then x must be (m + 1)-regular, from which it is easy to see that x, x , y, y all share the same height and hence y ∼ m x . Otherwise, y is m-initial. If x is m-initial, then define y = y , and if x is m-terminal, then choose y y , which is m-terminal. In either case, y ∼ m x , as needed.
Theorem 8.15. The formula p is not L R -definable over the class of persistent models.
Proof. Let φ ∈ L R , let n = |φ| and consider the model M n+1 . By Lemma 8.8, M n+1 , (1, 0) |= p and M n+1 , (1, 1) |= p. However, by Lemma 8.10.1, B n (1, 0) and B n (1, 1) are both initial, hence (1, 0) ∼ n (1, 1). By Lemma 7.6, M n+1 , (1, 0) |= φ if and only if M n+1 , (1, 1) |= φ. It follows that φ is not equivalent to p over the class of persistent models.
CONCLUSIONS
We have studied ITL e , an intuitionistic analogue of LTL based on expanding domain models from modal logic and first introduced in Reference [5] . In the literature, intuitionistic modal logic is typically interpreted over persistent models, but as we have shown this interpretation has the technical disadvantage of not enjoying the finite model property. Of course, this fact alone does not imply that ITL p is undecidable, and whether the latter is true remains an open problem. This should not be surprising, as decidability for intuitionistic modal logics with a transitive modal accessibility relation is notoriously difficult to prove [44] , having resisted proof techniques that have been successfully applied to other intuitionistic modal logics, such as those in, e.g., Reference [2] . Meanwhile, our semantics are natural in the sense that we impose the minimal conditions on S so that all truth values are monotone under , and a wider class of models is convenient as they can more easily be tailored for specific applications. Furthermore, we have presented the notions of bounded bisimulations and shown that, as happens in other modal intuitionistic logics or modal intermediate logics, modal operators are not interdefinable.
This work and Reference [5] represent the first attempts to study ITL e . Needless to say, many open questions remain. We know that ITL e is decidable, but the proposed decision procedure is non-elementary. However, there seems to be little reason to assume that this is optimal, raising the following question: Question 1. Are the satisfiability and validity problems for ITL e elementary?
Meanwhile, we saw in Theorems 6.14 and 4.6 that ITL e has the effective finite model property, while ITL p does not have the finite model property at all. However, it may yet be that ITL p is decidable despite this.
Question 2. Is ITL p decidable?
Regarding expressive completeness, it is known that LTL is expressively complete [19, 23, 26, 43] : L U is expressively equivalent to monadic first-order logic equipped with a linear order and "next" relation [19] . Persistent models can be viewed as models of first-order intuitionistic logic, and hence we can ask the same question of ITL p . Question 3. Is L U equally expressive to monadic first-order logic over the class of persistent models?
